Scott Brigham By Frank E. Brigham, Guadian Ad Litem v. Moon Lake Electric Association, Inc. : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1970 
Scott Brigham By Frank E. Brigham, Guadian Ad Litem v. Moon 
Lake Electric Association, Inc. : Brief of Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Stephen Nebeker; Attorney for Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric, No. 11869 (1970). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4952 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN 
:MULLINER, PRINCE & V ABalllil 
GERALD R. MILL.ER, Esq. 
DENIS R. :MORRILL, Esq. " 
KENNETH W. YEATES, atq. 
206 El Paso Natural Ga.a Buildiq. , ; - \: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 .. , , 
Attomeys for PT,a,imJiff-AppM/llat '-- · 
• • ' cTI 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE 
ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEG-
LIGENCE ------------------------------------------------ 4 
POINT II. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S 
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT ____ 8 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON DE-
FENDANT'S DUTY --------------------------------11 
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------15 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Brunson v. Strong, 17 U.2d 364, 368, 412 P.2d 451, 
453 ( 1966) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
Brush v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, 106 Ind. 
App. 554, 21 N.E.2d 83 (1939) ------------------------------------ 7 
Cornucopia Gold Mines v. Locken, 150 F.2d 75, (9th 
Cir.) cert. den. 326 U.S. 763 (1945) ____________________________ 15 
Dillard v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 73 
N.M. 40, 385 P.2d 564 (1963) ____________________________________ 14 
Driver v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 247 Md. 75, 
230 A.2d 321 (1967) -------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Foote v. Scott-New Madrid-Mississippi Electric 
Coop., 359 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1962) ________________________ 14 
Hamilton v. Southern Nevada Power Co., 273 P.2d 
760 (Nev. 1954) -------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Hanson v. Washington Water Power Co., 165 Wash. 
497, 5 P.2d 1025 (1931) ------------------------------------------------ 7 
Jones v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 334 S.W.2d 263, 
265 ( 1960) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
Kimiko Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co., 12 U.2d 
278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961) --------------------------------------------12 
Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 
118 U. 20, 218 P.2d 685 (1950) ------------------------------------ 6 
Koch v. Telluride Power Co., 116 U. 237, 209 P.2d 
241 ( 1949) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 
P.2d 990 (1964) -------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
Roos v. Consumers Public Power District, 171 Neb. 
563, 106 N.W.2d 871 (1961) ----------------------------------------13 
TEXTS 
26 Am. Jur. 2d, Electricity, §75 pp. 281-282 ------------------------ 6 
29 C.J.S., Electricity, §38, p. 1056 ________________________________________ 13 
STATUTES 
Rule 9 (i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ---------------------------- 8 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure -------------------------------- 5 




STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT BRIGHAM, by Frank E. 
Brigham, Guardian ad litem, 
P"laintif !-Appellant, 
vs. 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIA-




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the afternoon of June 28, 1968, Frank Brigham took 
his three sons, Scott, age 10, Michael, age 15, and Stephen, 
age 12, and a neighbor boy on a trip to look for arrowheads 
(Tr. 14). They drove to an area east of Roosevelt near 
Fort Duchesne, Utah, where they stayed overnight in Mr. 
Brigham's camper (Tr. 15). The following morning they 
climbed to the top of a mesa and started looking for arrow-
heads (Tr. 17). Mr. Brigham and his son Michael were 
parallel to each other and Scott was behind Michael. The 
other two boys were further back (Tr. 18). They were 
walking in a northerly direction with the sun shining behind 
them as they walked across the mesa (Tr. 44). The top 
of the mesa was a flat, barren piece of terrain (Tr. 45). 
Moon Lake had contructed a single phase 7200 volt distribu-
2 
tion electric line in the area which cut across the mesa in an 
east-west direction (Tr. 78). The line consisted of a hot 
wire and a ground wire. Scott saw the wires, which were 
"silverish" in color (Tr. 38, 175). One pole of the line was 
located on the west side of the mesa and another pole 
was located on the east side (See defendant's exhibits D-1 
through D-8). These poles were 125 feet apart (defendant's 
exhibit D-9). Mr. Brigham saw the pole on the west side 
of the mesa as he walked under the power line (Tr. 50). 
On the morning of June 29, 1968, the pole on the east side 
of the mesa was down (Tr. 24). The wires went from the 
pole on the west side of the mesa to the insulator on the 
downed pole at about a 45° angle (Tr. 175). The wires 
didn't touch the ground but went down into the valley 
(Tr. 24). 
Mr. Bingham heard Michael shout, "Dad!" and he turned 
and saw Scott hanging from the wire (Tr. 19). Mr. Brig-
ham ran to Scott, and just as he got to him, Scott fell to the 
ground, apparently lifeless (Tr. 20). Mr. Brigham pro-
ceeded to give him mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and re-
vived him (Tr. 20). Mr. Brigham took Scott to the hospital 
in Roosevelt, Utah where he was given emergency treat-
ment and released (Tr. 23). 
At the time of the trial, Scott Brigham testified he 
could not remember coming to a wire on the mesa (Tr. 17 4). 
During the course of cross-examination, the following testi-
mony was read to Scott from his deposition: 
"A (continuing by Mr. Nebeker) Scott, starting on 
line twenty-four the reporter transcribed a question 
which I asked you and which reads: 'While you were 
looking for arrowheads I understand you came across 
a pole line, a power pole that was down?' 
Your answer: 'I didn't notice the pole, but I saw the 
wire.' 
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Then I said : 'Where was the wire that you saw? Was 
it up in the air or down on the ground?' 
Your answer was: It was coming to the ground at 
about a forty-five degree angle.' " 
Scott stated that he thought the answers given at the 
time of the deposition were right (Tr. 175). 
Mr. Ernest Ballard, the general manager for Moon 
Lake, testified he talked to Scott on the afternoon of June 
29, 1968, while he was in his father's. camper in the parking 
lot of the Roosevelt Hospital. 
Mr. Ballard stated: 
"A Okay. As near as I recall Scott indicated that 
he saw his older brother pick up a wire and walk under 
it and he asked him if it was a hot wire or an electric 
wire and got an answer 'no,' and apparently from the 
conversation the next thing he had his hand up against 
the conductor and he indicated to me that he reached 
up and touched the conductor which in this case was 
the actual energized conductor rather than the ground 
conductor which his brother had just previously 
touched and received no problem. I think that's in 
essence the conversation. There were other things 
talked about, but I have no recollection at this time.'' 
(Tr. 242) 
Mr. Ballard testified the servicemen of Moon Lake 
were instructed to constantly inspect the distribution lines in 
their area of operation (Tr. 83). He said in two to three 
months the servicemen would see most of the distribu-
tion line in their particular service area (Tr. 83). 
Russ Cramer, the line superintendent for Moon Lake', 
testified the company retired approximately 150 poles each 
year because of discontinuance of service, road wideni.ng 
(Tr. 181-182) or construction projects such as Starvation 
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Dam (Tr. 84). These poles are inspected and either put back 
in the "store" for reuse or discarded (Tr. 182). This be-
comes a random system of retirement because they never 
know who is going to leave a farm resulting in idle service 
(Tr. 85). 
Mr. Cramer further testified that he inspected the 
transmission lines by aircraft after deer season and after 
winter damage (Tr. 181). The distribution lines are in-
spected by air at more frequent intervals, depending upon 
the trouble areas (Tr. 180). 
A Mr. Phil Opsal, expert in wood technology and pole 
line inspections, testified that in his opinion Moon Lake 
had employed a reasonable inspection system (Tr. 221). 
The case was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories. The jury found the defendant negligent and 
that such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries and also that Scott Brigham was negligent and that 
such negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. The 
plaintiff took no exception to the form of the verdict. Based 
upon the answers to interrogatories, the court instructed 
the Clerk to enter a verdict of no cause of action (Tr. 255). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEG-
LIGENCE. 
Since the jury found the defendant negligent, Point I 
of plaintiff's brief is moot. Any error in the instructions 
cannot be prejudicial because the jury found the defendant 
negligent. 
The only issue on this appeal is whether the trial court 
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properly instructed the jury on the question of contribu-
tory negligence and whether there is sufficient evidence to 
sustain the finding of plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
The court submitted the following instructions on con-
tributory negligence: 
"Instruction No. 7 
Persons in the position of plaintiff Scott Brigham 
at the time of the event in question are under a duty 
to make reasonable observations to learn the condi-
tions confronting him and to take reasonable measures 
to observe and avoid dangers confronting him. What 
observations he should make and what he should do for 
his own safety while thus proceeding are matters the 
law does not attempt to regulate in detail and for all 
occasions, except in this respect: It places upon him 
the continuing duty to exercise the care an ordinary 
prudent person would observe to avoid an accident, 
under the circumstances then existing. Failure to dis-
charge that duty would constitute negligence." (R. 
153) 
"Instruction No. 8 
"A child is not bound to exercise the same degree 
of care for his safety that is required of an adult. While 
there is no inflexible rule or standard in terms of years 
which can be laid down as a guide for determining the 
question of negligence on the part of a child, the law 
requires of a child that degree of care and caution 
which is ordinarily exercised by children of the same 
age, intelligence, capacity, and experience, under the 
circurnstances then existing." (R. 154) 
The plaintiff did not except to the court's instructions 
on contributory negligence. Having failed to except, they 
should not be allowed to claim error on their appeal. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
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"* * * No party may assign as error the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. 
In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party 
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects 
and the grounds of his objection. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its dis-
cretion and in the interests of justice, may review the 
giving or failure to give an instruction. * * *" 
Although the rule does allow the review of the giving 
or failure to give an instruction, this court has been reluc-
tant to do so where the party claiming error failed to make 
a proper exception. See Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western R. Co., 118 U. 20, 218 P.2d 685. (1950). 
This court has held that a jury may find a minor child 
guilty of contributory negligence. In Rivas v. Pacific Fi-
nance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P.2d 990 (1964), a six-
year-old plaintiff was riding on a sleigh when he was struck 
by defendant motorist. The jury found adversely to the 
plaintiff. This court affirmed the lower court verdict for 
defendant, stating: 
"We ai·e in accord with the idea that a child is 
not expected to have the maturity of judgment nor 
the capacity to cope with danger that an adult would 
have and consequently, is not held to the adult standard 
of care. Nevertheless, a child even of this age has some 
duty of care for his own safety, and if he fails to ob-
serve it can be guilty of contributory negligence. The 
requirement is that he exercise that degree of care 
which ordinarily would be observed by children of the 
same age, intelligence and experience under similar 
circumstances." Id. at 185, 397 P.2d at 991. (Emphasis 
added) 
The general rule applicable to the situation in the case 
at bar is stated in 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Electricity §75, pp. 281-
282 (1966) : 
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. "Usually the question of contributory negligence 
in actions for injuries to inf ants by coming in con-
tact with a wire charged with electricity is held to be 
for the jury, especially where the contact with the wire 
was accidental, or the child was mistaken as to the 
nature of the wire and no shock was anticipated or the 
circumstances were such as to lead the child to 
1
believe 
that no serious harm would result * * * However, the 
age, knowledge and experience of a particular infant 
may be such that his conduct in voluntarily coming in 
contact with a live wire can be declared negligent by 
the court, especially where the opportunity for contact 
with the wire is not presented to one using the premises 
or the street in an ordinary way." See also 69 A.L.R. 
2d 51, §11 (1960). (Emphasis added) 
This court has held that contributory negligence of an 
adult may bar recovery against an electric company for 
personal injuries caused by electrical transformers. Koch 
v. Telluride Power Co., 116 Utah 237, 209 P.2d 241 (1949). 
Cases in other jurisdictions have indicated that children 
injured by electricity may be precluded from recovery by 
their contributory negligence. Driver v. Potomac Electric 
Power Company, 247 Md. 75, 230 A.2d 321 (1967) (17-year-
old boy injured when well-drilling rig hit electric trans-
mission line) ; Jones v. Kentucky Utilities Company, 334 
S.W. 2d 263, 265 (1960) (15-year-old boy electrocuted while 
climbing and walking on top of a bridge) ; Hamilton v. 
Southern Nevada Power Co., 273 P.2d 760 (Nev. 1954) 
(16-year-old boy injured when pipe hit power line); Brush 
v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, 106 Ind. App. 554, 21 N.E. 
2d 83 (1939) (14-year-old boy injured on transformer); 
Hanson v. Washington Water Power Company, 165 Wash. 
497, 5 P.2d 1025 (1931) (11-year-old child climbing fence 
and tower of electricity). 
Defendant contends that Section 54-7-22, Utah Code 
Annotated, (Rep. Vol. 1953) cited in plaintiff's brief dO:s 
not alter the existing law regarding the duty of electnc 
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companies, that it does not abolish the defense of con-
tributory negligence, and, therefore, is not in point. 
Initially, it should be pointed out that plaintiffs did 
not plead the statute in their complaint as required by Rule 
9 (i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It was not dis-
cussed at the time of the pretrial and was not incorporated 
in the pretrial order (R. 81-82). It was never mentioned 
during the course of the two-day trial in Vernal, Utah. 
In any event, the statute does not abrogate the defense 
of contributory negligence. It states that the utility will be 
liable only if such injury or damage is "caused thereby or 
result(s) therefrom." If the injury or damage was caused 
or contributed to by the negligent acts or omissions of the 
plaintiff, then clearly there could be no recovery. 
The jury did find the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence and that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of his injuries. Such a finding was based on proper 
instructions, and on substantial evidence. 
POINT II. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S FINDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT. 
In Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 368, 412 P.2d 
451, 453 (1966) this Court stated the following with respect 
to verdicts by a jury: 
"Due to its acknowledged prerogatives, its advan-
taged position, and the desirability of safeguarding the 
integrity of the jury system the courts are and should 
be reluctant to interfere with a jury verdict and will 
not do so as long as there is any reasonable bases in 
the evidence to justify it." 
Respondent respectfully urges that there was a rea-
sonable and substantial basis upon which the jury could 
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have found the plaintiff contributorily negligent. The un-
controverted evidence in the record is that on the morning 
of the accident the day was clear and that the sun was shin-
ing (Tr. 40). Plaintiff's father testified the transmission 
wires had a silvery appearance (Tr. 45). There was also 
testimony that the top of the mesa where plaintiff was at 
the time of the accident was flat and that the brush thereon 
was relatively low (Tr. 45). The wires were apparently 
five to five and one half feet off the ground where Scott 
received the electrical shock (Tr. 30). Plaintiff's father 
indicates that when he first noticed plaintiff seconds after 
the accident, plaintiff was "hanging from his right hand" on 
the wires and plaintiff's left foot was touching the ground 
(Tr. 19). 
A jury, on basis of all this evidence, could reasonably 
have concluded that the line on which plaintiff was injured 
was clearly visible to a ten-year-old boy. The fact that these 
particular lines had a silvery, aluminum-type appearance 
could be found to have given reasonable warning to a boy of 
plaintiff's age that the lines were dangerous. The position 
of the plaintiff immediately after the accident, namely, 
hanging from his right hand on the wires, could have 
led a reasonable jury to find that plaintiff had negli-
gently grabbed an activated wire which was clearly visible 
to him. 
In addition, the aforementioned Mr. Ballard testified 
of a conversation he had with plaintiff on the day of the 
accident. That testimony was as follows : 
" ... Scott indicated that he saw his older brother 
pick up a wire and walk under it and he asked him if 
it was a hot wire or an electric wire and got an answer 
"no," and apparently from the conversation the next 
thing he had his hand up against the conductor and 
he indicated to me that he reached up and touched the 
conductor which in this case was the actual energized 
conductor rather than the ground conductor which his 
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brother had just previously touched and received no 
problem." (Tr. 242) 
The jury could have found from this testimony that 
plaintiff, despite his youth, recognized the general danger 
of electric wires, and specifically recognized the possibility 
that these wires might be hot. The jury might also have 
found that even though his brother, Michael, was not 
electrocuted when he touched the ground conductor that 
plaintiff was not excused from touching the other conductor 
which was energized. The mere fact that Michael was not 
hurt when he negligently touched the ground conductor 
could reasonably have been found not to justify plaintiff's 
negligent and voluntary touching of the second, energized 
wire. 
Further evidence from which a reasonable finding of 
contributory negligence could be based is the testimony of 
plaintiff contained in his deposition. On cross-examination 
plaintiff had some difficulty remembering the events at 
the time of the accident. Counsel for defendant attempted 
to refresh plaintiff's memory by reading from the depo-
sition: 
"Question (continuing by Mr. Nebeker) Scott, 
starting on line twenty-four [page 9] the reporter 
transcribed a question which I asked you and which 
reads: 'While you were looking for arrowheads I 
understand you came across a pole line, a power pole 
that was down?' 
Your answer: 'I didn't notice the pole, but I saw 
the wire.' 
Then I said: 'Where was the wire that you saw? 
Was it up in the air or down on the ground?' 
Your answer was: 'It was coming to the ground 
at about a forty-five degree angle." (Tr. 175) 
Although Scott could not remember giving these an-
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swers at the time of the trial, he did agree that his memory 
of the accident might have been better at the time of the 
than it was at the time of trial (Tr. 176). The 
could have accepted Scott's testimony from his deposi-
tion that he saw the wire. They could also have found that 
he touched it when he knew or should have known that it 
was dangerous. 
Respondent contends there was ample evidence indi-
cating that plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that 
a jury could so conclude. Because of this evidence the find-
ing of contributory negligence by the jury should not be 
disturbed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON DEFENDANT'S DUTY. 
The jury found the defendant negligent and that such 
negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
In view of this finding, any error in the court's instruction 
on defendant's duty cannot be prejudicial. However de-
fendant contends the trial court properly instructed the jury 
on defendant's duty. The court instructed the jury that the 
defendant Moon Lake was required to take exceptional pre-
cautions to prevent an injury from its electrical transmis-
sion line: 
"Instruction No. 6 
One who has under his control an instrumentality 
exceptionally dangerous in character is bound to take 
exceptional precautions to prevent an injury being 
done by the instrumentality. The degree of care must 
be equal to the degree of danger involved. A high 
voltage electric transmission line is an exceptionally 
dangerous instrumentality and distributors of elec-
tricity maintaining such lines are under a correspond-
ing duty to protect the public from danger therefrom. 
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In this connection such a distributor is obliged to 
observe due care: 
( 1) To cause reasonable inspection to be made 
of such transmission lines, including supporting struc-
tures, to discover defects or dangerous conditions 
therein existing. 
(2) To repair or remove dangerous conditions it 
knows to exist or of which it should know by exercise 
of due care. 
(3) To cause reasonable warning to be given 
persons in the position of plaintiffs of dangerous con-
ditions of which it knows, or should know by the exer-
cise of due care, but which are not known to them. 
Failure of such distributor to act in accordance 
with the foregoing would constitute negligence on its 
part." (R. 152) 
The plaintiff's failed to except to this instruction. Plain-
tiff's failure to except to the instruction as required by Rule 
51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, precludes them from 
claiming error on this instruction. 
The State of Utah is committed to the general rule 
that an electric company is required to exercise a high de-
gree of care. In the case of Kimiko Toma v. Utah Power 
& Light Co., 12 Utah 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961), the 
administratrix of a deceased workman's estate sued the 
defendant electric company for the death of decedent. The 
trial court granted a directed verdict for the defendant and 
this court affirmed. This court stated the electric company 
was obliged to meet a high standard of care: 
"The defendant in this case was engaged as a 
public utility in furnishing electric power to a large 
number of customers. It was furnished various persons 
under different and peculiar circumstances. In all cases 
it is required to exercise the degree of care that a per-
son of ordinary prudence would under the circum-
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stances. It is well known that one dealing with 
electricity deals with a force of dangerous character 
and that there is a constant risk of injury to person or 
property if not properly controlled. The care observed 
must be commensurate with and proportionate to the 
danger. Therefore, the defendant company was obliged 
to meet a high standard of care, which was greater in 
some cases than another depending on the exigency of 
the service rendered." Id. at 282-283, 365 P.2d at 791 
(Emphasis added). 
All jurisdictions considering the question have held 
electric companies are not liable for injuries unless guilty 
of a wrongful act: 
"Electrical companies are not insurers of the safety 
of the public or of those whose occupation is likely to 
bring them into dangerous contact with their appli-
ances, and hence are not liable for injuries unless guilty 
of some wrongful act or omission." 29 C.J.S. Electricity 
§38, p. 1057 (1965) (Emphasis added). 
Cases from 34 jurisdictions are cited as authority for 
the above proposition. Id. at pp. 1057-1058. 
The following cases illustrate the standard of care 
applicable to power companies. In Roos v. Consumers Pub-
lic Power District, 171 Neb. 563, 106 N.W.2d 871 (1961), 
plaintiff sued the defendant power company for damages 
allegedly sustained when a power line broke. Plaintiff al-
leged the defendant had failed to make proper inspection 
of the lines. The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed a 
lower Court decision adverse to the electric company. The 
Court held: 
"A power company engaged in the transmission 
of electricity is required to exercise reasonable care in 
the construction and maintenance of its lines. The de-
gree of care varies with the circumstances, but it must 
be commensurate with the dangers involved, and where 
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wires are designed to carry electricity of high voltage, 
the law imposes upon the company the duty of exer-
cising the utmost care and prudence consistent with the 
practical operation of its business to avoid injury to 
persons and property [citations]. Electric companies 
are not insurers of the safety of the public and hence 
are not liable for injuries unless guilty of some wrong-
ful act or omission [citation]." 106 N.W. 2d at 876 
In Dillard v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 
73 N.M. 40, 385 P.2d 564 (1963) plaintiff, an operator on 
an oil well servicing truck, sued the defendant utility for 
personal injuries incurred when the mast of the well came 
into contact with a power line. The lower Court granted 
defendant's. motion for summary judgment and the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico affirmed, indicating with approval an 
earlier case wherein it was stated: 
". . . the correct measure of care owed by one 
handling high-power electrical current [is] to be the 
exercise of a degree of care in the construction and 
maintenance of its lines 'commensurate with the dan-
ger to be apprehended ... but they are not insurers 
against accidents or injuries.'" 385 P.2d at 566. 
And in Foote v. Scott--New Madrid-Mississippi Elec-
tric Coop., 359 SW 2d 40 (Mo. App. 1962) the parents of a 
sixteen year old boy brought an action for wrongful death 
against defendant. The evidence indicated the boy threw 
a copper wire attached to a tin can over an electric power 
line and was electrocuted. The appellate court reversed a 
trial court judgment for plaintiff. The Court held: 
" ... although, the judicial declarations in this 
jurisdiction have firmly fixed and uniformly adhered 
to the utmost or highest degree of care as the required 
standard, it is perfectly plain that here, as elsewhere 
[citation], an electric company is not an insurer of the 
safety of persons and property, and that its liability 
vel non in a given situation is determinable upon prin-
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ciples of negligence." Id. at 43. See also Eastern Shore 
Public Service Company v. Corbett, 277 Md. 411, 177 
A.2d 701, 709 (1962) ; Alabama Power Company v. 
King, 190 So. 2d 674, 679 (Ala. 1966) ; Hercules Powder 
Company v. Di Sabatino, 188 A.2d 529, 533 (1963). 
Counsel for respondent have been unable to find any 
American case holding an electric company strictly liable 
for damages under either an ultrahazardous activity or 
product liability theory. The Cornucopia Gold Mines v. 
Locken, 150 F.2d 75 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 326 U.S. 763 
(1945) case referred to in App€llant's Brief (pp. 7-8) sets a 
negligence standard for power companies, and does not de-
part from the general rule. 
The trial court's instruction regarding defendant's duty 
is a clear statement of the law and fully covered plaintiff's 
allegations of negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to try their case on 
one theory in the trial court, and having lost, try another 
theory in this court. This is particularly true where they 
took no exceptions to the court's instructions. The trial court 
properly instructed the jury on the issue of contributory 
negligence. The jury found the plaintiff guilty of con-
tributory negligence and that such negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of his injuries. This finding was based on 
substantial evidence. The judgment of the lower court should 
be affirmed. 
ResP€ctfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER, Esq. 
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